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| Udofia & Oyetola |
Before dawn over Lagos, the fishing jetties at Ijora and other coastal communities should be alive with the rhythms of an industrial harvest. Trawlers returning from weeks at sea would normally unload dense catches of shrimp, croaker, and other species. Processors would sort them into baskets.
Traders would scramble to supply markets from Lagos to the hinterland. Instead, an increasing number of Nigerian-owned vessels sit idle, tied to the piers. Their owners can no longer justify the cost of putting them to sea.
This is the visible face of a structural crisis in one of Nigeria’s most under-realized natural resource sectors. Fishermen, engineers, deckhands, processors, transporters, and traders whose livelihoods depend on industrial fishing are feeling the squeeze. While indigenous operators battle soaring diesel prices, limited access to finance, ageing vessels, and weak infrastructure, foreign interests—particularly Chinese and Indian operators—have grown more prominent in Nigeria’s commercial fishing waters. The shift raises a fundamental question for a country with roughly 853 kilometres of Atlantic coastline and a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone: who is capturing the value of Nigeria’s fish resources?
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The Import Paradox Deepens
Nigeria’s frozen fish and seafood imports climbed to $866 million in 2025, up from $606 million in 2023 and $688.5 million in 2024, according to United Nations COMTRADE data cited by Rear Admiral Thaddeus Udofia (rtd.), Director-General of the International Maritime Institute of Nigeria (IMION).
That three-year rise represents a compound annual growth rate of about 19.5 percent. Udofia presented the figures at the 2026 National Conference on Sustainable Fishing organised by the Maritime Correspondents’ Organisation of Nigeria (MARCON).
The numbers expose a classic blue-economy paradox. Nigeria possesses substantial marine and inland fisheries resources yet continues to spend hundreds of millions of scarce foreign exchange importing fish. Domestic production has improved modestly—rising to about 1.4 million metric tonnes in 2025 from roughly 1.1 million tonnes in 2024—but remains far below estimated annual demand of 3.2 to 3.6 million tonnes. The resulting supply gap of roughly 2–2.4 million tonnes is filled largely by imports.
Fisheries and aquaculture contribute an estimated 3–4 percent of Nigeria’s GDP and supply a significant share of the animal protein consumed by Nigerians. The sector supports millions of livelihoods, especially among artisanal fishers, fish farmers, processors, and traders. Women make up over 60 percent of the workforce in many parts of the value chain. Yet the industrial segment that could close the gap more efficiently is in retreat.
Local Fleet Grounded by Costs
For Nigerian trawler owners, the crisis is immediate and arithmetic. Every expedition requires operators to weigh the cost of diesel, crew, maintenance, ice, gear, and provisions against the expected catch.
The numbers no longer work. The Nigerian Trawler Owners Association (NITOA) reports that more than 80 percent of its members’ vessels have been grounded, primarily because of escalating diesel prices and other operating costs. Diesel that once cost around ₦900 per litre has risen to ₦1,800–₦2,000 in recent periods, more than doubling the fuel burden for vessels that run continuously on marine diesel.
NITOA President Mrs. Benedette Okonkwo has repeatedly highlighted the absence of alternative energy sources for vessels that operate around the clock. “Our vessels operate 24/7 on diesel, and there is no alternate source of energy,” she has noted. Retired Navy Captain Oladele Robinson, National Executive Secretary of the Fisheries Cooperatives Federation of Nigeria, adds that operators sometimes return from sea without enough catch to cover the cost of the trip. The result is a cascade effect: when a commercial trawler stops operating, the surrounding economic chain—seafarers, engineers, mechanics, processors, cold-chain operators, transporters, and traders—begins to shrink. Estimates suggest thousands of jobs are at risk.
Historical context sharpens the picture. Two decades ago, Nigeria had more than 200–250 industrial vessels operated by dozens of companies.
Today, the active fleet is a fraction of that size, with only a handful of companies still viable. Harsh operating conditions, maritime insecurity, and the high cost of spare parts and modernisation have forced many indigenous operators out.
Foreign Presence and Monitoring Gaps
The vacuum has been filled in part by foreign industrial fleets. Comrade Adewale Adeyanju, Deputy President of the Nigeria Labour Congress, has publicly alleged that Chinese and Indian operators have become dominant in Nigerian fishing waters. “Licenses are issued. Chinese and Indian trawlers work in our waters and there is little visible monitoring of catch, landings, or whether Nigeria is actually earning from the stock,” Adeyanju said. He has called for the publication of licensed vessels, ownership details (including beneficial ownership), fishing activities, landing records, and revenues paid to government.
Precise figures on the share of Chinese and Indian ownership remain opaque without comprehensive, publicly available licensing and beneficial-ownership data. The concern, however, sits within a broader West African pattern. Chinese distant-water fleets have a significant presence across the region, and West Africa has become a global hotspot for illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Estimates of regional losses run into billions of dollars annually. Nigeria itself loses tens of millions each year to IUU activities.
Recent enforcement actions illustrate both the problem and the limited response. Under Operation Abo Eja and related exercises, the Nigerian Navy and fisheries authorities have intercepted vessels for suspected illegal fishing and arrested crews that included Chinese nationals. In one late-2026 operation, three vessels and 33 crew members (including Chinese, Ghanaian, and Nigerian nationals) were detained. Navy statements have also referenced Chinese vessels held for illegal fishing. Stakeholders argue these operations need to become systematic rather than episodic, supported by real-time Vessel Monitoring Systems, satellite surveillance, and stricter enforcement of catch limits and mesh-size regulations.
Artisanal fishers have long complained that industrial trawlers sometimes encroach on nearshore zones reserved for small-scale operators, damaging gear and depleting local stocks. Bottom trawling, in particular, raises ecological concerns about habitat damage and long-term productivity of the marine ecosystem. Udofia has warned that unsustainable exploitation risks undermining the very resource base Nigeria hopes to develop.
Capital, Infrastructure, and Policy Gaps
The core problem is not merely the nationality of operators. It is Nigeria’s failure to mobilise sufficient domestic capital, modern vessels, technology, and processing capacity to compete effectively.
Industrial fishing requires heavy, long-term investment. Commercial banks remain reluctant to finance the sector because of its inherent risks—engine failure, poor catches, fuel-price volatility, and fluctuating fish prices. Lagos State officials have publicly identified this financing gap as a major constraint on acquiring boats, engines, and equipment.
Without affordable, long-term finance, indigenous operators cannot modernise ageing fleets or expand. Stakeholders have therefore called for a dedicated fisheries financing facility involving government, development banks, and commercial lenders to support vessel acquisition and rehabilitation, cold storage, processing plants, and related infrastructure. Modern fishing ports with ice plants, laboratories, and repair yards are also essential.
A coherent local-content regime for industrial fishing could require foreign operators to demonstrate meaningful Nigerian participation through employment, training, technology transfer, local procurement, domestic processing, and equity stakes. Publishing a transparent register of licensed vessels would improve accountability. Stronger integration of fisheries into the broader blue-economy strategy—alongside maritime transport, coastal tourism, and marine renewable energy—would help align incentives.
The China Export Window
Ironically, while Nigeria spent $866 million importing seafood in 2025, a potential export opportunity has opened with China. In August 2026, Nigeria and China signed a protocol on inspection and quarantine requirements for wild aquatic products, providing the framework for eligible Nigerian seafood to enter the Chinese market. China’s zero-tariff policy for eligible Nigerian (and other African) exports took effect in May 2026. China’s aquatic-product imports exceed $20 billion annually, making it one of the world’s largest markets.
Yet Nigeria cannot export what it cannot produce competitively and at scale. Without a substantial increase in sustainable domestic production and processing capacity that meets international sanitary standards, the China opportunity risks remaining largely theoretical. Current Nigerian seafood exports are modest—primarily to European markets—while imports continue to dominate the domestic market.
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Path Forward
Closing even a portion of the 2-million-tonne supply gap through modern commercial fishing and expanded aquaculture would reduce the import bill, create jobs, improve food security, and potentially generate export earnings. Achieving that requires coordinated action: transparent licensing and monitoring, dedicated financing, fleet modernisation, better cold-chain and port infrastructure, rigorous enforcement against IUU fishing, skills development for marine engineers and processors, and a regulatory balance that protects both industrial productivity and artisanal livelihoods and marine ecosystems.
Nigeria’s blue-economy ambitions will remain constrained as long as the majority of its industrial fishing vessels stay tied to the jetties. The central question is not how many more foreign trawlers the country can attract, but how many Nigerian-owned vessels it can return to productive, sustainable operation in its own waters. The resource is there.
The demand is there. The missing pieces are capital, capacity, governance, and political will.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Technology.
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