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| Ambassador Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu |
In a pointed intervention that underscores both urgency and frustration, Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu, has called for a comprehensive strengthening—and in practical terms, a functional overhaul—of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Speaking at the opening of a two-day Consultative Forum in Abuja on 8 October 2026, she framed the gathering as a critical step toward implementing African Union Assembly Decision 967 of February 2026, which requires concrete recommendations on reforming the continental security framework by January 2027. von.gov.ng
The forum, held at the Muhammadu Buhari Conference Centre, focuses on four priority pillars: mediation and preventive diplomacy, early warning and response, counter-terrorism, and peace support operations. Odumegwu-Ojukwu’s message was clear: Africa’s existing tools are ambitious on paper but too often fall short in practice, leaving the continent vulnerable to accelerating threats.
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A Spreading Threat Landscape
The minister painted a sobering picture of insecurity that has moved far beyond its earlier epicentres. Terrorism, once largely concentrated in the Sahel, has expanded into West Africa’s coastal states, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique. Armed groups are no longer relying solely on conventional guerrilla tactics. They now deploy drones, exploit illicit financial flows, partner with organised criminal networks, and finance operations through illegal artisanal mining.
This evolution reflects a deeper structural problem.
Fragmented responses, overlapping regional processes (such as the Nouakchott and Djibouti mechanisms), and heavy reliance on external partners—including private military companies—have diluted continental ownership. Nigeria’s own experience is instructive. As a frontline state in the fight against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province in the Lake Chad Basin, and as a contributor to multinational efforts, Abuja has repeatedly seen how delayed continental action allows threats to metastasise across borders.
Odumegwu-Ojukwu captured the core dilemma with precision: “Our early warning is sound, but early action is slow. Our operations are boldly conceived, but their financing is uncertain. Our norms are clear, but their application has been inconsistent.” von.gov.ng
Decision 967 and APSA’s Ambitions
APSA, established under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, remains one of the most comprehensive regional security frameworks globally. It encompasses the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and its regional brigades, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Union Peace Fund. On paper, it provides a continuum from prevention through mediation to robust intervention.
Yet implementation gaps have persisted for years.
The High-Level Panel on the Review of AU’s Governance, Peace and Security Frameworks, whose findings informed Decision 967 at the 39th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly in Addis Ababa in February 2026, highlighted these shortcomings. The Decision specifically tasked the AU Commission Chairperson with developing recommendations in the critical areas of mediation, dialogue, preventive diplomacy, early warning and response, counter-terrorism, and peace support operations, for submission by January 2027.
The Abuja forum builds on earlier work, including a High-Level Panel of Eminent Africans convened in Nairobi in September 2025. It also aligns with broader AU institutional reform efforts championed by leaders such as Kenya’s President William Ruto, which emphasise efficiency, coherence between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and APSA, and reduced silos.
Priority Reforms: Closing the Gaps
Odumegwu-Ojukwu outlined practical steps across the four thematic areas. On early warning and mediation, she stressed that prevention is cheaper, faster, and more humane than post-conflict response. She called for the CEWS to deliver concise, decision-oriented briefs to the PSC; a mediation coordination mechanism to end “forum-shopping”; a vetted roster of deployable African mediators and experts; stronger national peace infrastructures; and greater use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). foreignaffairs.gov.ng
In counter-terrorism, the emphasis shifted to root causes. Local grievances, youth unemployment, and weak community resilience create fertile ground for recruitment. Overly broad or poorly overseen counter-terrorism laws risk eroding public trust and fueling radicalisation. Nigeria advocates rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, intelligence-sharing through mechanisms such as the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), and full utilisation of the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) as the continental focal point. A new Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Counter-Terrorism (2026–2030) provides a framework, but coordination remains fragmented.
Financing and peace support operations form the most persistent bottleneck. The AU Peace Fund has made progress—member states have contributed hundreds of millions toward capitalisation targets—but it cannot substitute for predictable external support. Odumegwu-Ojukwu urged full application of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2719, which opens pathways for UN funding of AU-led operations, alongside complete operationalisation of the African Standby Force and regional standby arrangements. She insisted the Peace Fund must complement, not replace, UN obligations.
A recurring theme is clearer division of labour among the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), and the United Nations. Without it, overlapping mandates produce delay and inefficiency.
Nigeria’s Stake and the Case for Self-Reliance
Nigeria’s leadership on this issue is not abstract. As Africa’s most populous nation and a major troop and resource contributor to regional security initiatives, it bears significant costs from insecurity that spills across borders. The Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, ECOWAS stabilisation efforts, and diplomatic engagement in the Sahel all illustrate Abuja’s practical investment.
At the same time, domestic pressures—banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, and oil theft—underscore that continental weakness amplifies national vulnerabilities.
The minister’s push for a more self-reliant architecture reflects a wider recognition that the traditional multilateral order is under strain. In a multipolar environment, external partners’ priorities can shift, and dependence on them risks strategic autonomy. Strengthening African-owned tools—predictable funding, rapid deployment capacity, and governance-focused prevention—offers a path toward genuine ownership.
Challenges remain formidable. Political will among 55 member states varies. Resource constraints are real. Unconstitutional changes of government in parts of the Sahel have complicated regional cooperation. Yet the alternative—continued reactive, underfunded, and poorly coordinated responses—is costlier in both human and economic terms. Insecurity disrupts trade corridors critical to the African Continental Free Trade Area, displaces millions, and diverts resources from development under Agenda 2063.
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Looking Ahead
The Abuja forum is expected to generate practical, implementable recommendations that member states can adopt. If successful, these will feed into the AU Commission’s report due in January 2027.
Success will require more than technical fixes: consistent application of norms, genuine synergy between continental and regional bodies, and sustained political commitment to close the gap between early warning and early action.
Odumegwu-Ojukwu expressed measured optimism that the deliberations would reposition Africa’s institutions for better results. The stakes are high.
Terrorism and instability are no longer peripheral challenges; they are central tests of the African Union’s relevance and of Africa’s capacity to shape its own security destiny. A functional, adequately resourced, and African-led APSA is not merely desirable—it is essential if the continent is to move from managing crises to preventing them.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Technology.
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