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| IGP — Tunji Disu |
The August 15, 2026, Osun State governorship election returned Governor Ademola Adeleke of the Accord Party for a second term. Politically, the dust has largely settled. On the streets, in motor parks, and in neighbourhoods across Osogbo, Ile-Ife, Ikire and beyond, a more stubborn problem persists: a pattern of cult-related killings, factional clashes within transport unions, and the lingering presence of street-level enforcers that together risk turning election-season mobilisation into a more permanent feature of local power struggles.
What began as concerns over pre-election violence—police recorded more than 30 politically linked killings in the build-up—has evolved into something security agencies now frequently describe as “purely cult-related.” Yet the distinction is not always clean. Cult groups, National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) factions, political thugs and informal commercial networks often overlap in recruitment, territory, weapons access and patronage. The result is a security challenge that outlasts the ballot box.
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From campaign flashpoints to post-election bloodshed
In the weeks after the poll, several incidents underscored the continuity of violence. On August 19, gunfire erupted near the palace of the Ataoja of Osogbo while Governor Adeleke and his nephew, the global Afrobeats star Davido (David Adeleke), paid a courtesy visit. One resident was killed. Days later, at Naira and Kobo Junction in Ikire, Irewole Local Government Area, two people died in violence linked by police to a transport-union factional crisis. Four young suspects—Sikiru Ademola Adedeji, 21; Olalere Taiwo, 21; Olalere Ademola, 26; and Bankole Abiodun, 20—were arrested. One of the victims, Fatai Shobowale, was reportedly travelling when he was caught in the violence. An AK-47 was allegedly snatched from a policeman during the confrontation.
A more politically charged killing followed in mid-September. Olalekan Oyeyemi, popularly known as Emir Ajagungbade, a political associate of the Adeleke administration and figure connected to transport-park politics, was shot dead near Mayfair Motor Park in Ile-Ife. Reports indicated he had attended a meeting with the Commissioner for Transport, Sesan Oyedele, in Modakeke amid efforts to address leadership disputes in the parks.
Allegations swirled involving another aide, Wakeel Nurudeen Alowonle (Alowonle), and a transport-union figure identified as Sibi; both denied involvement. Adeleke ordered an investigation and directed warring factions to vacate the parks while pushing for a Park Management System. Another body was recovered near the scene.
By early October, the violence had not abated. Rival cult attacks in Osogbo left multiple dead and injured, including the killing of Adebayo Taoreed (“Small Rugged”), a figure previously accused by the opposition APC of involvement in earlier violence, and others. Residents and traders in areas such as Old Garage and Oke-Baale reported closing businesses early out of fear. Governor Adeleke summoned security chiefs for an emergency meeting to address the spike in cult killings and related breaches. Police deployed tactical teams, conducted raids and insisted the recent incidents were cult-driven rather than purely political.
These events sit against a longer backdrop. Pre-election monitoring recorded dozens of violent incidents. Cult confraternities such as Aiye and Eiye have featured in clashes, including a pre-poll incident in Ilesa that left three dead. The line between cult supremacy battles, control of lucrative motor parks, and political mobilisation has blurred for years in parts of the South-West.
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| Governor Ademola Adeleke |
The deeper networks: parks, patronage and youth violence
Motor parks are not merely transport hubs; they are economic and political nodes. Control brings revenue from levies, influence over voters and access to young men who can be mobilised for enforcement. When politicians cultivate relationships with garage leaders or street groups, those networks do not automatically demobilise after results are declared. A former DSS director and security expert, Akin Adeyi, has described the patronage of motor-garage touts by politicians as deeply troubling, arguing that recovery of illicit arms—including through mechanisms such as buy-backs—must form part of any serious response.
Security analyst and sociology perspectives reinforce this. Professor John Agbonifo of Osun State University has stressed that political leaders must publicly condemn violence, educate supporters and disown perpetrators regardless of affiliation. Civil society voices, including Waheed Saka of Dialogue 365, have argued that the political class bears responsibility for the proliferation of non-state actors through arming or shielding thugs—claims that require case-by-case evidence but reflect a widespread perception.
Cultism itself has deep roots in Nigerian tertiary institutions and has migrated into street-level organised violence. Rival groups settle scores, compete for territory and sometimes offer services to political or commercial interests. High youth unemployment, limited legitimate economic pathways and the status and protection sometimes associated with group membership create a ready recruitment pool. Once weapons circulate and cycles of reprisal begin, political motivation becomes secondary; the violence sustains itself.
Police Public Relations Officer Abiodun Ojelabi has repeatedly characterised recent incidents as cult-related and stated that the command is not folding its hands. Commissioner of Police Ibrahim Zungura has ordered Area Commanders and Divisional Police Officers to monitor developments closely and work with community stakeholders for intelligence.
The state government has announced an Election Violence Relief Committee chaired by the Speaker of the House of Assembly and a Commission of Enquiry into the Ikire killings. Adeleke has publicly directed that anyone involved in violence—including relatives—should face the law.
Yet effectiveness hinges on sustained investigation free of political interference, successful prosecution, recovery of illicit arms, and disruption of the financing and logistical support that keep these networks viable. Arrests after individual killings matter, but they do not automatically dismantle the structures that enable recurrence.
Political responses and the risk of normalisation
Both major camps have sought to distance themselves. The APC has rejected association with post-election violence, pointing to earlier losses among its members and framing some incidents as internal transport-union matters. The Adeleke administration insists the governor abhors violence and has consistently called for peace. Blame-shifting is predictable; it does not resolve the underlying problem.
The larger danger is normalisation. When cult clashes, park takeovers and street enforcement become routine responses to commercial or personal disputes, the threshold for violence lowers.
Innocent residents, traders and travellers become collateral. Public confidence in the state’s ability to monopolise legitimate force erodes. In a state still navigating the aftermath of a hard-fought election, fragile peace can tip into chronic insecurity.
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What lasting progress requires
Addressing the threat demands more than reactive policing. Intelligence-led operations against cult networks and recovery of weapons are essential short-term steps. Medium-term measures include transparent management of motor parks that reduces the premium on violent control, youth employment and skills programmes that offer credible alternatives to recruitment into gangs, and consistent public repudiation by political leaders of any association with violent actors. Traditional rulers, community leaders, civil society and security agencies need sustained coordination rather than episodic meetings after high-profile killings.
Osun’s experience is not unique in Nigeria’s electoral landscape, but it is instructive. Election-related violence often draws on pre-existing informal power structures. When those structures are left intact, they outlive the campaign calendar.
The August 15 contest is over. The networks of cult groups, garage factions and street enforcers are not. Whether Osun can prevent them from becoming a permanent feature of its social and political environment will determine how durable its post-election peace proves to be.
The immediate priority remains establishing facts, identifying perpetrators and recovering arms. The deeper test is whether political, security and community leadership can confront the conditions—patronage, economic stakes in informal spaces, and youth vulnerability—that allow such violence to regenerate. Until those are addressed with seriousness and consistency, the streets and parks of Osun will continue to carry risks that the ballot box alone cannot resolve.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Technology.
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