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| Nigerian Troops |
Nigerian security forces have scored a significant victory against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) with the neutralisation of Abdussamad Ohida, a senior commander also known as Anwar, during a joint intelligence-led operation in the Owo Forest of Ondo State. The Defence Headquarters (DHQ) formally confirmed the development on Friday, 30 October 2026, during its monthly operational briefing to defence correspondents.
Major General Michael Onoja, Director of Defence Media Operations, stated that the operation took place on 2 October 2026. A combined team of security forces targeted terrorist elements operating in the forest. “Some terrorists were neutralised during the operation, including Ohida, who was identified as the deputy to the ISWAP leader in Central Nigeria,” Onoja said. He noted that Ohida had assumed leadership of the group’s activities in the region following the arrest of its former leader by the Department of State Services (DSS) in 2023.
Onoja described the elimination as a major operational breakthrough that would deal a significant blow to ISWAP’s efforts to expand its operational presence in Nigeria. He added that Ohida had been involved in planning large-scale attacks against civilians in several states during the forthcoming festive season. The operation, he emphasised, forms part of the Armed Forces’ sustained campaign to dismantle terrorist networks, disrupt leadership structures, and prevent planned attacks on innocent citizens, particularly ahead of the holiday period.
Who Was Abdussamad Ohida?
Multiple security sources, speaking in the days immediately after the raid, provided a clearer picture of Ohida’s role and trajectory. He previously served as deputy to Abu Ikrimah (also known as Abu Uwais), the ISWAP Central Nigeria leader arrested by the DSS in 2023. After that arrest, Ohida stepped into a leadership position overseeing ISWAP activities across parts of the North-Central and southern regions of the country. In that capacity he played a key role in planning, coordinating, and executing operations.
Sources linked him to several high-profile attacks. These include the 31 December 2025 invasion of the Ipele Divisional Police Station in Owo, Ondo State, during which attackers carted away AK-47 rifles before destroying the station with explosives; the 28 July 2022 assault on a military checkpoint along the Suleja–Zuba Road in Niger State that killed soldiers, officers, and civilians; and connections to other incidents such as the 2022 Kuje Correctional Centre attack and strikes on police formations in Kogi State. Intelligence obtained during the interrogation of Abu Ikrimah reportedly helped authorities track Ohida’s activities and uncover his more recent plans.
Those plans, according to security sources, centred on large-scale attacks targeting civilians in southern states during the Christmas and New Year festive period, with the broader aim of creating instability that could disrupt preparations for the 2027 general elections. The intelligence was said to have been corroborated by partners in the United Kingdom, who also supported the elimination operation.
The Joint Operation and Its Context
The raid was a multi-agency effort involving Nigerian Army troops (including elements linked to the 32 Artillery Brigade in Akure), DSS personnel, and operatives of the Western Nigeria Security Network, popularly known as Amotekun. Security sources described it as intelligence-driven and executed as a surprise assault on the group’s forest hideout. Several other members of the terrorist group were also neutralised.
The 32 Artillery Brigade’s Assistant Director of Army Public Relations, Major Innocent Olamale, confirmed the joint and intelligence-led nature of the operation in the days following the raid. Ondo State Governor Lucky Aiyedatiwa publicly commended the agencies involved, highlighting the importance of inter-agency cooperation, intelligence sharing, and proactive measures in addressing emerging threats.
The operation underscored growing coordination between federal forces and regional security outfits in the South-West, a region that has historically faced different security challenges from the North-East and North-West but has seen increasing concern over the southward creep of jihadist and criminal networks.
ISWAP, an Islamic State affiliate that splintered from Boko Haram, has primarily operated in the Lake Chad Basin and parts of northern Nigeria. Its attempts to establish or expand presence further south, into the North-Central and even South-West forests, represent a strategic evolution that Nigerian authorities have worked to contain. The presence of a senior commander like Ohida in Ondo’s forests—close to communities that suffered the 2022 Owo church attack and other incidents—highlighted the risks of that expansion. Forested areas in Ondo and neighbouring states have long provided cover for various criminal and insurgent activities, making sustained, intelligence-driven clearance operations essential.
Broader Implications
Leadership decapitation remains a core element of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism approach. Removing experienced planners and coordinators can disrupt networks, degrade operational tempo, and force groups into a more reactive posture. Onoja’s characterisation of Ohida’s death as a blow to expansion efforts aligns with assessments from security sources who described it as a setback to ISWAP’s command structure and southern ambitions.
At the same time, the threat is adaptive. ISWAP and related groups have repeatedly regenerated leadership and shifted tactics. The foiling of planned festive-season attacks is welcome news for communities that have endured years of insecurity, but it does not eliminate the underlying challenges of porous borders, difficult terrain, local grievances, and the need for sustained civilian-military cooperation. The involvement of Amotekun also points to the practical value of regional security architectures working alongside national forces—an approach that has gained traction in the South-West amid debates over state policing and local intelligence.
The timing of the DHQ briefing, nearly a month after the operation, fits the pattern of consolidating and publicly accounting for operational successes across theatres. It comes as security agencies intensify efforts ahead of the festive season and as the country moves closer to the next electoral cycle, periods that historically see elevated risks of violence.
In summary, the neutralisation of Abdussamad Ohida removes a key figure who had risen to prominence in ISWAP’s central and southern operations and who was actively preparing attacks designed to sow fear and disrupt national stability. It demonstrates the value of persistent intelligence work, inter-agency collaboration, and targeted action against leadership nodes.
While no single operation ends the broader insurgency, successive disruptions of this kind raise the cost of expansion for groups like ISWAP and buy critical space for communities and authorities to strengthen resilience. Sustained pressure, improved local intelligence, and addressing root drivers of insecurity will remain necessary if such gains are to translate into lasting security improvements.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers Global, News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Politics and Technology.
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