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From rehabilitating troubled hydropower plants to building lasting technical competence, the record of Mainstream Energy Solutions Limited under its pioneer managing director offers concrete lessons for a power sector that still struggles to convert installed capacity into dependable supply.
Last week in Abuja, industry leaders, engineers, regulators, colleagues and friends gathered to mark the retirement of Lamu Audu, the pioneer Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of Mainstream Energy Solutions Limited (MESL).
Tributes highlighted a career spanning decades in Nigeria’s electricity industry, including 13 years leading a company that has become one of the country’s most significant hydropower operators.
Beyond the ceremonies, Audu’s departure poses a sharper question the sector can no longer sidestep: what would change if the competence, technical discipline and institutional continuity associated with his leadership became the standard for managing Nigeria’s entire power industry?
Since the 2013 privatisation, Nigerians have waited for improved electricity supply to become everyday reality. Installed generation capacity has grown, yet households and businesses still face unreliable supply and rely heavily on generators, inverters and solar systems. The core problem is not a simple shortage of generating assets. It is the persistent failure to make existing infrastructure work efficiently, deliver power to consumers and recover enough revenue to sustain investment.
The stubborn gap between installed and available capacity
NERC’s August 2026 Operational Performance Factsheet illustrated the scale of the challenge. Against installed capacity of about 13,625 MW, average available capacity stood at 4,758 MW, while average generation was approximately 4,102 MW—barely a third of installed capacity was available for dispatch.
Later figures showed some improvement: available capacity averaged around 5,038 MW in September 2026, with generation near 4,089 MW and an 81% load factor. Peak available generation has occasionally exceeded 5,400 MW. Yet the structural gap remains: Nigeria routinely operates far below its nameplate capacity.
That gap explains why supply stays inadequate despite years of reform and successive government interventions. Power Minister Joseph Tegbe has publicly noted that less than half of the country’s more than 13,000 MW of installed capacity reliably reaches homes and businesses.
From near-zero to recovered capacity: the Kainji and Jebba story
When Mainstream took over the Kainji and Jebba hydropower plants in November 2013, the assets faced severe operational problems. Kainji (installed capacity 760 MW, designed originally for higher output) had no generating units operational. Jebba (578.4 MW) was constrained by equipment and operational issues. The company inherited ageing equipment, obsolete control systems and low staff morale.
Leadership treated these as solvable engineering and management problems rather than permanent limits. Through sustained investment, rehabilitation and workforce development, Mainstream expanded the combined available capacity of the two plants substantially.
Company figures and Audu’s accounts indicate recovery from roughly 460–580 MW at takeover toward 922 MW and, in later updates, higher figures approaching or exceeding 1,000 MW of available capacity through successive unit rehabilitations. Investments have included modern supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, personnel development and operational safety improvements.
The company later expanded its portfolio to include Zungeru (700 MW installed) via a subsidiary and other assets such as Kashimbila. Zungeru, completed at significant cost and handed over under concession arrangements, has itself operated below full capacity at times—illustrating that even relatively new assets require disciplined operations, maintenance and favourable market conditions to deliver consistently.
The significance of Mainstream’s work is not just the megawatt numbers. It lies in the approach: acquiring infrastructure is not the same as making it productive. Privatisation transferred ownership and operational responsibility, but it did not automatically fix the financial, technical and institutional problems inherited from the former public system. Reform succeeds when measured by functioning equipment, dependable output, competent personnel and sustainable operations—not by ownership changes or announced capacity alone.
Why the wider sector remains trapped
Several interlocking bottlenecks persist.
Generation constraints. Plants cannot produce at rated capacity when equipment is defective, maintenance is deferred, gas supplies are unreliable (for thermal plants) or operators lack working capital. Hydropower faces its own issues: ageing infrastructure, hydrology variability and the continuous need for capital reinvestment. Grid collapses have numbered well over 100 (total and partial) since privatisation, with earlier tallies already exceeding 100 by the early 2020s and further incidents since.
Transmission and distribution. Electricity must still travel through transmission infrastructure and distribution networks. Congestion, technical losses, inadequate infrastructure and commercial weaknesses prevent additional generation from reaching consumers. NERC has recorded transmission loss factors in the high single digits (around 8.5% in some quarterly reports). Distribution companies face collection shortfalls that starve the value chain of cash.
Market finances. When payments do not flow reliably, generators cannot fund maintenance or expansion. Consumers experience poor supply, estimated billing problems and rising costs. These problems cannot be solved by one competent managing director at one company. They demand coordinated action across generation, transmission, distribution, regulation and market finance.
Hydropower’s strategic value is often under-appreciated. Nigeria’s total exploitable hydropower potential is estimated at around 14 GW or higher in some assessments, yet only roughly 2.5–2.7 GW currently contributes meaningfully to the grid. Large plants (Kainji, Jebba, Shiroro, Zungeru) form the backbone of this contribution, while small and run-of-river opportunities remain largely undeveloped.
Hydropower offers dispatchable, relatively low-carbon baseload or flexible power that can complement intermittent solar and help stabilise the grid—if the assets are properly maintained and operated.
Climate variability adds complexity: changing rainfall patterns can affect reservoir levels and seasonal output, making adaptive management and better hydrological coordination essential.
The leadership and institutional question
At Audu’s farewell, speakers including a Mainstream director, a former NERC chairman, public-sector figures and colleagues emphasised not only individual performance but the building of teams capable of rehabilitating critical infrastructure and sustaining operations. The deeper issue for Nigeria is why such capacity is not more consistently present across the sector.
Appointments to strategic positions too often prioritise political accommodation over transparent assessment of technical knowledge, managerial experience and demonstrated results. Where loyalty trumps competence, institutions lose continuity, accountability weakens and costly mistakes are repeated. Political oversight of a sector of national importance is legitimate; what is required is clear objectives, appointment of qualified professionals, and performance measured against published targets.
Audu himself stressed that Mainstream’s achievements were collective—board, shareholders, management and staff. Nigeria cannot build a reliable electricity industry around a succession of exceptional individuals. It needs institutions in which competent leadership is supported by professional staff, predictable regulation, adequate financing and measurable accountability.
Practical steps toward institutional competence
Several concrete measures follow from the Mainstream experience and the broader sector diagnosis:
1. Prioritise rehabilitation and maintenance of existing assets before celebrating new capacity announcements. Every major plant should have transparent performance targets covering availability, generation, maintenance schedules and safety metrics, with public reporting.
2. Base appointments to critical technical and regulatory roles on demonstrable qualifications, relevant experience and track record. Boards should publish clear expectations for managing directors and evaluate them against those expectations.
3. Align investment with operational priorities. Generators need predictable market payments. Transmission and distribution companies need investment plans tied to verifiable service improvements. Regulators must enforce obligations consistently rather than allow chronic underperformance to become normalised.
4. Strengthen succession planning and knowledge transfer. Mainstream’s transition to a successor (Siraj Abdullahi has been named) is a test of whether institutional knowledge can survive leadership change. The wider sector needs similar deliberate continuity mechanisms.
5. Place consumers at the centre of success metrics. Installed capacity, financial returns and corporate growth matter, but they cannot substitute for dependable electricity in homes, hospitals, schools and factories.
Smaller hydropower and brownfield conversion of existing dams and water infrastructure offer additional near-term opportunities if project preparation, regulatory clarity and bankable commercial structures improve. Experts have repeatedly highlighted the need for clearer pipelines of investment-ready projects and reduced political and approval risks.
A legacy that should challenge the system
Audu’s 13-year tenure does not provide a complete solution to Nigeria’s electricity crisis. Mainstream operates a specific portfolio of hydropower assets, and its experience cannot be copied wholesale across every segment of the industry—gas-fired plants, transmission and distribution each face distinct constraints.
It does, however, demonstrate what sustained technical leadership, systematic rehabilitation, investment in people and organisational continuity can achieve even under difficult market conditions.
At his farewell, Audu recalled his chairman’s words: “If we don’t invest as Nigerians, who will?” The question now extends beyond capital to the quality of leadership and governance that surrounds it.
Nigeria has spent years restructuring its electricity industry. The next phase must concentrate on making the system work: restoring available capacity closer to installed levels, strengthening the grid, improving distribution performance, securing market finances, and appointing people capable of delivering measurable results. Hydropower assets—already built or partially recovered—represent one of the clearer opportunities to do so, provided competence is institutionalised rather than left to chance.
The ultimate measure of Audu’s legacy will not be the tributes paid at his retirement. It will be whether the lessons of disciplined technical management are applied beyond Mainstream. For a country where unreliable electricity continues to constrain businesses, public services and daily life, that is the challenge worth carrying forward.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers Global, News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Politics and Technology.
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