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| Police stand guard as student protests in Paris |
The kids are not alright. Across Europe, from the tent cities of Madrid’s Puerta del Sol and Lisbon’s Rossio Square to blockaded lycées in France, occupied high schools in Italy, and student marches outside the Greek parliament, a generation born roughly between the mid-1990s and early 2010s has taken to the streets in a sustained autumn of discontent.
Their grievances range from underfunded education and crumbling school infrastructure to impossible housing costs, stagnant opportunities, and a broader sense that the social contract promising a better life than their parents’ has broken. These are not isolated outbursts. They form a visible, networked expression of intergenerational frustration that is already testing governments under fiscal strain and raising questions about political stability in several countries.
The catalysts differ by country, yet the underlying pressures converge. In Spain, the September 2023 eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from the Madrid home she had occupied for more than seven decades became a flashpoint. An investment fund had acquired the building and sought rent hikes that far exceeded her pension. Images of the wheelchair-using pensioner being removed on a stretcher ignited protests that rapidly escalated into nationwide tent encampments demanding rent controls, stronger tenant protections, and an end to speculative practices.
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| Protests in France spiraled into rioting |
Abascal’s subsequent death in early October intensified the movement, turning her into a symbol; a shrine and memorials appeared at the Sol camp, and marches paid tribute while linking her case to broader unaffordability. House prices and rents had surged for years, outpacing wage growth, with average rents in major cities approaching or exceeding minimum-wage levels for modest apartments.
The pressure forced Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s government into emergency housing measures that failed in parliament, prompting a snap election for late November.
In France, the spark was more familiar but hit harder this year. High-school students have long protested at the start of the school year over missing teachers, overcrowded classes, dilapidated buildings, long days, and opaque university admissions via Parcoursup. In late September 2026 the protests intensified, with blockades, marches, and occasional clashes.
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| Anti-riot police clashed with demonstrators in Milan |
Students demanded smaller classes, more teachers, climate-resilient infrastructure, and an end to what they described as heavy-handed policing. The movement broadened as teachers, parents, unions, and later Yellow Vest remnants and cost-of-living campaigners joined. Hundreds of thousands marched on peak days; authorities reported thousands of arrests, many involving minors, and injuries on both sides.
The government responded with promises of thousands of additional supply teachers and budget discussions, but students and unions vowed to continue. Macron, near the end of his second term, faces a constrained fiscal environment and approaching presidential politics.
Albania’s student-led unrest, part of the broader “Flamingo” anti-government movement, began with opposition to a large luxury coastal tourism development linked to an investment vehicle associated with Jared Kushner. Protesters argued it threatened environmental protections and reflected deeper corruption and elite capture. Months of largely peaceful action turned more confrontational in October as high-school and university students joined, clashing with police using tear gas and water cannons.
Demands expanded to education funding, lower costs, and the resignation of long-serving Prime Minister Edi Rama, who rejected calls to step down while framing the unrest as a threat to EU accession plans.
Similar patterns appeared elsewhere. Italian students occupied schools and marched with slogans explicitly referencing France (“like in France”), linking education cuts and unsafe buildings to housing costs and opposition to the Meloni government’s priorities. In Greece, students and teachers marched and set up tents outside parliament, chanting for public free education “from Greece to France” while highlighting student housing shortages that force many to abandon studies or commute long distances. Portuguese protesters mirrored Spain with evening gatherings and tent camps in Lisbon and Porto, demanding rent caps and reversal of eviction-easing laws amid house prices that had more than doubled over a decade, roughly twice the EU average pace.
Belgium, Austria, and pockets of Germany and Serbia saw related actions focused on education budgets, living costs, or anti-corruption.
Despite local triggers, these movements have functioned as magnets for accumulated discontent. Young people describe a generation that fears it will not match parental living standards. Housing is the most visceral shared issue: in many Southern and Western European cities, rents and purchase prices have risen far faster than incomes, driven by limited supply, tourism and short-term rentals, foreign and investment buying, and post-pandemic shifts. Students frequently report sharing rooms, long commutes, or returning home because independent living is unaffordable.
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| Protesters took part in a rally organized by teachers and students demanding improvements to education and measures to address the rising costs of living Athens, Greece |
Education complaints are equally consistent—teacher shortages, outdated or unsafe buildings ill-suited to heatwaves, and underinvestment that feels especially acute when governments prioritize other spending, including defense amid geopolitical tensions.
Broader structural factors amplify the anger. Entry-level job markets feel precarious; artificial intelligence is already disrupting routine and junior roles that once offered pathways for graduates. The climate crisis adds urgency—students demand schools that can withstand extreme weather while criticizing insufficient green investment.
High national debt levels in countries such as France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium constrain public spending responses. Bond market pressures, including elevated French yields at times, underline the limited fiscal room. Post-2008 austerity scars, uneven recovery, and the lingering cost-of-living effects of energy shocks have left many young Europeans feeling the promise of liberal democratic prosperity no longer holds.
Cross-border inspiration and coordination are notable. French slogans and tactics appeared in Italy and Greece. Spanish housing camps influenced Portugal. Student unions exchange experiences and advice. Social media accelerates the spread of images, tactics, and narratives, allowing rapid mobilization that older generations sometimes struggle to match. This is not a single pan-European organization but a set of overlapping, mutually reinforcing national movements that share diagnostics of systemic failure.
Analysts and participants frame the moment as a failure of delivery for the next generation. Julius Fintelmann of the European Correspondent has described it as frustration that European politics is not delivering for young people, with AI-driven job uncertainty and climate risks compounding education and housing failures. Student leaders echo the point: investment in youth, education, and housing is inseparable from social justice and dignified work. Older protesters have joined on housing and cost-of-living issues, showing the grievances are not purely generational even if Gen Z provides much of the energy and visibility.
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| Protesters set trash cans on fire during clashes with police |
Governments face difficult trade-offs. Expanding public spending on schools and social housing collides with debt dynamics and competing priorities. Some have offered concessions—extra teachers in France, emergency housing proposals in Spain—while emphasizing order and dismissing radical elements. Hard-right and populist voices have sought to reframe aspects of the unrest (for example, linking French school problems to integration challenges), while left-leaning forces emphasize inequality and speculation.
Upcoming dates matter: further French union actions and a general strike call, Spanish general strike plans, German Gen Z-organized protests, and student days of action in Britain and Italy. Spain’s snap election and Serbia’s parliamentary contest (where long-running student-led opposition has challenged the incumbent) give the unrest direct political stakes. In Albania the pressure on the government remains intense.
This wave differs from pure breaking-news events because it rests on long-building material conditions rather than a single dramatic incident.
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| A protesters holding a banner reading “we are governed by clowns” |
Europe’s youth face higher barriers to independent adulthood than many of their parents did at the same age—delayed homeownership or stable renting, greater educational precarity, and a labor market transforming faster than training systems can adapt. Historical parallels exist (1968 student revolts, later anti-austerity movements, the Yellow Vests), yet the combination of housing scarcity in desirable cities, climate anxiety, digital coordination, and fiscal limits is distinctive.
Whether the protests produce lasting policy shifts—rent regulation, sustained education investment, targeted youth housing—or dissipate after temporary concessions will depend on governments’ capacity to respond without worsening debt dynamics and on the movements’ ability to sustain pressure beyond the autumn calendar.
For now, the message from the streets is clear and consistent across borders: a generation that grew up amid crises feels the system is no longer calibrated to deliver opportunity. The kids are not alright, and Europe’s
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers Global, News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Politics and Technology.






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