In the quiet Madina Quarters of Bauchi metropolis, a local mosque has become an unexpected flashpoint in Nigeria’s early political jockeying for the 2027 general elections.
The committee of Masjid Abdullahi Bin Zubbair has removed Imam Dahiru Abubakar from his position, accusing him of repeatedly using post-prayer sermons and the mosque premises to campaign for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election.
The decision, confirmed by committee chairman Imam Abubakar Jibrin, came after what members described as multiple ignored warnings. Abubakar had continued addressing worshippers after the Subhi (dawn) prayer on a recent Sunday, insisting that Tinubu was not responsible for Nigeria’s insecurity challenges and that he deserved another term in office.
Sources close to the mosque said the imam had made similar comments in previous weeks, framing them as calls for patience and divine intervention rather than overt partisanship.
Abubakar has defended his actions. He told reporters that his messages urged people to stop “castigating” the president for security and economic difficulties. “I have been preaching to the people to stop castigating President Tinubu for the insecurity and economic challenges,” he said, adding that some worshippers already appeared ready to support the president in 2027. He insisted his core focus remained the fear of God and everyday moral guidance, pointing to conflicts in Sudan, Chad, and Mali to question whether Nigeria’s leader could reasonably be blamed for regional insecurity patterns.
Jibrin painted a different picture. The core problem, he said, was not merely support for one politician but the transformation of sacred space into a political arena. “Our major challenge with him was not only his campaign for Tinubu but the way and manner he gathered many people in front of the mosque and sometimes entered the mosque purposely to discuss politics,” the chairman stated. The committee had repeatedly cautioned Abubakar, citing Quranic principles that mosques are solely for the worship of Allah. Politics, Jibrin argued, has its proper channels through political parties and their offices.
Compounding the dispute was an alleged proposal by the imam to rename the mosque Masjid Imam Bola Ahmed Tinubu. The committee rejected the idea outright. “All the committee members said ‘no’ because the mosque belongs to the community,” Jibrin said. The existing name, honouring the early Islamic companion Abdullahi Bin Zubair, would remain. The committee has ruled out any reinstatement. “He should go and build his personal mosque, or politicians should go buy a mosque for him; that is not our business,” Jibrin declared, while stressing that the body was not opposed to any particular candidate. Their prayer, he added, was for Allah to select leaders who would prove a blessing to the country, regardless of party.
Religion, Politics, and the Sacred Space Dilemma
This episode is not isolated. Nigeria’s religious institutions have long occupied an ambiguous position in the country’s politics. Mosques and churches serve as powerful community hubs, especially in the North, where imams wield significant moral authority. Yet the boundary between spiritual guidance and partisan mobilisation has repeatedly proven porous, particularly during election cycles.
In recent months, senior voices have issued explicit warnings against politicising places of worship ahead of 2027. The Registrar of the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB), Professor Ishaq Oloyede, told a gathering of imams that pulpits should not become platforms for partisanship. Imams may engage as private citizens, he noted, but those seeking elective office should resign religious roles to avoid polarising their congregations. Similarly, the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC), co-chaired by the Sultan of Sokoto, and Secretary to the Government of the Federation George Akume have urged religious leaders to keep politics out of churches and mosques, emphasising that leadership selection belongs at the ballot box rather than the altar or minbar.
The sensitivity is understandable. Nigeria’s history includes moments when religious rhetoric amplified ethnic and regional divides. The 2023 election cycle saw intense debate around the APC’s Muslim-Muslim ticket. Critics warned that framing support in religious terms risked deepening fault lines. Some northern clerics have more recently cautioned against campaigning for Tinubu primarily on the basis of shared faith, urging instead a focus on concrete performance metrics—security, economy, and governance record.
Bauchi itself sits at an interesting intersection of these dynamics. The state has deep Islamic scholarly traditions, most notably linked to the late Sheikh Dahiru Usman Bauchi, a towering Tijjaniyya leader whose death in late 2025 prompted a high-profile condolence visit by President Tinubu. During that visit, Tinubu renamed the Federal University of Medical Sciences, Azare, after the sheikh—an act that underscored the president’s efforts to cultivate relationships with northern religious networks.
At the same time, political mobilisation for 2027 is already visible on the ground in Bauchi. Support groups have distributed campaign vehicles, held stakeholder engagements, and publicly targeted ambitious vote numbers for Tinubu from the state. These activities occur against a backdrop of persistent insecurity in the North-East and wider economic pressures that dominate public conversation.
The Insecurity Question and Broader Implications
Abubakar’s defence centred on rejecting the narrative that Tinubu bears sole or primary responsibility for Nigeria’s security challenges. Insecurity—banditry, farmer-herder clashes, residual Boko Haram/ISWAP activity, and kidnapping—remains a defining grievance for many northern communities. Successive administrations have struggled to deliver lasting improvements. By invoking conflicts in neighbouring Sahelian states, the imam sought to place Nigeria’s problems in a regional context of climate stress, weak governance, arms proliferation, and transnational criminal networks.
Yet for critics of the administration, such framing can appear to deflect accountability. Governments are expected to protect citizens within their borders, and public frustration over rising costs of living, fuel prices, and uneven security outcomes has been palpable. When religious leaders enter this debate from the pulpit, they risk being perceived as shielding power rather than speaking truth to it—or, conversely, as unfairly attacking leaders.
The Bauchi case illustrates a deeper structural tension. Mosques function as rare spaces of trust and moral authority in communities often sceptical of formal political institutions. When that trust is leveraged for partisan ends, it can erode the institution’s credibility among those who disagree. Committees such as the one at Masjid Abdullahi Bin Zubbair are asserting a form of institutional self-preservation: protecting the mosque’s primary purpose as a place of worship and communal unity.
There is also a practical political calculation at work. Early and overt campaigning inside religious spaces can alienate undecided or opposition-leaning worshippers, create internal fractures, and invite accusations of using sacred institutions as extensions of party machinery. In a multi-religious, multi-ethnic federation still recovering from previous electoral strains, such practices carry risks of wider polarisation.
Looking Ahead
As Nigeria moves closer to the 2027 contest, incidents like the removal of Imam Dahiru Abubakar are likely to multiply. Religious leaders will face mounting pressure from politicians seeking moral endorsement, while congregations and mosque committees will continue testing the limits of what constitutes legitimate guidance versus campaigning. The Quranic emphasis on mosques as houses of pure worship provides a clear doctrinal anchor for those who want to draw firm lines. Whether that line holds under the weight of intense political competition remains an open question.
For now, Masjid Abdullahi Bin Zubbair has chosen clarity: politics has its arenas, and the mosque is not one of them. The former imam is free to continue his advocacy elsewhere. The episode serves as a small but revealing window into the competing claims on Nigeria’s most trusted institutions as the next electoral cycle gathers force—far earlier than many might prefer.
Samuel O. Sulaimon is the founder and Editor-in-Chief of Naijapiz. He covers Global, News, Sports, Finance, Faiths, Education, Politics and Technology.
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